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Do Critical Audit Matter Disclosures Impact Investor Behavior? 
Qian Huang 
 
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has recently required auditors to 
disclose critical audit matters (CAMs), which are financial statement matters that involve 
especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgments. The PCAOB contends that 
CAMs will increase the decision usefulness of the auditor’s report and indirectly benefit investors 
by increasing audit and financial reporting quality. I examine whether investors react to CAM 
disclosures and whether they perceive any change in adopting firms’ financial reporting quality. 
Using a difference-in-differences design, I find that (1) while there is no significant stock price 
reaction to CAMs on average, investors react negatively to CAMs disclosed by firms with high 
levels of short interest; (2) there is a significant increase in the quarterly earnings response 
coefficient for adopting firms. The effect is driven by big-N audit firms, and increases with the 
number of CAMs reported. Collectively, the evidence suggests that investors use CAMs to confirm 
their pre-existing opinions about a firm, and that they perceive an improvement in audit quality 
and financial reporting reliability due to the CAM disclosure requirement. 
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In line with worldwide efforts to increase the informativeness of the auditor’s report, the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has required auditors to disclose “critical 
audit matters” (CAMs), which are matters material to financial statements and involve especially 
challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgments (PCAOB 2017). Prior to this mandate, the 
auditor’s report contains only a standardized pass/fail opinion and provides very little of the 
information the auditor knows about the firm. CAM disclosures are intended to reduce the 
information asymmetry between investors and auditors by providing information on matters of 
high measurement uncertainty and the audit procedures performed to address such matters. 
The PCAOB contends that the communication of CAMs would benefit investors in several 
different ways. First, CAMs may provide investors with new information, focus their attention on 
key financial reporting issues, and enable them to evaluate the rigor of the audit. This should 
facilitate investors’ analysis of a firm’s financial reporting. Second, the process of identifying and 
disclosing CAMs may incentivize auditors to improve audit quality, which ultimately results in 
higher financial reporting quality. To the extent that investors perceive an improvement in audit 
and financial reporting quality, they should become more confident about the reliability of the 
financial statements. Third, CAMs may provide a signal of audit quality as auditors can now 
distinguish themselves based on the usefulness of the CAMs disclosed (PCAOB 2017). However, 
it is unclear whether the CAM disclosure requirement has achieved the intended goals. In this 
paper, I investigate the impact of CAM disclosures on investor behavior from two aspects—
whether investors react to the release of CAM information, and whether they perceive a firm’s 
financial reporting to be more reliable after it starts disclosing CAMs. 
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Since the primary objective of the CAM disclosure mandate is to make the auditor’s report 
more useful and informative to investors, I start my analysis by examining the short-window 
investor reaction around the release date of annual reports containing CAM information1. While 
some experimental studies provide evidence that investors use the risk disclosure in the expanded 
auditor’s report to inform their investment decisions (Christensen et al. 2014; Kachelmeier et al. 
2019), prior and concurrent empirical studies generally find no significant change in investor 
reaction associated with the expanded auditor’s report (Gutierrez et al. 2018; Lennox et al. 2019; 
Filer and Gencer 2020; Burke et al. 2020). 
Given the absence of significant investor reaction, I explore the possibility that investors 
react more strongly to CAMs if they have pre-existing concerns about a firm’s financial reporting. 
My proxy for investors’ pre-existing concerns is short interest measured at the end of the fiscal 
year. Since short sellers are professional investors who often anticipate negative future returns and 
financial statement manipulations (Cassell et al. 2011; Dechow et al. 1996; Desai et al. 2006; 
Efendi and Swanson 2009; Karpoff and Lou 2010), observing a high level of short interest may 
increase other investors’ suspicion over the target firm’s financial reporting. This is especially true 
when activist short sellers publish negative reports about a firm (Brendel and Ryans 2020). Ex 
ante, however, investors cannot be certain whether short sellers are right in betting against a firm. 
In such cases, investors may interpret CAMs, which are official disclosures from the auditor 
describing complex and uncertain accounting estimates, as confirmation of short sellers’ 
suspicions about a firm’s financial reporting quality. Investors may then perceive a higher risk of 
misstatement and react negatively to CAM disclosures. 
                                                 
1 The auditor’s report is a part of a firm’s 10-K filing. Therefore, CAM information becomes accessible to investors 
on the filing date of 10-Ks. 
3 
 
To examine my hypothesis, I implement a difference-in-differences design that compares 
two groups of firms subject to different CAM disclosure requirements. Specifically, since the 
CAM disclosure requirement became effective for large accelerated filers for fiscal years ending 
on or after June 30, 2019, but does not apply to other firms until December 15, 2020, large 
accelerated filers are the only firms that filed 10-Ks containing CAMs during the 2019 fiscal year2. 
This enables me to examine the change in the outcome variables for CAM-disclosing firms from 
the pre-period to the post-period relative to a set of control firms that do not disclose CAMs.  
Using abnormal stock return as a proxy for investor reaction, I find that investors react 
negatively to CAMs disclosed by firms with high levels of short interest. Among the firms required 
to disclose CAMs, the ones with high short interest experience a 5.2% more negative abnormal 
stock return around 10-K compared to the ones with low short interest. In additional tests, I further 
verify that this result is not driven by the difference between treatment and control firms, change 
in short interest in response to 10-K filings, or market correction for overvalued stocks. Therefore, 
the findings suggest that investors do use the information in CAMs to confirm their pre-existing 
concerns about a firm. 
Besides improving the usefulness of the auditor’s report, CAM disclosures are also 
expected to enhance investor confidence in the financial statements. Thus I examine whether 
investors perceive a firm’s financial reporting to be more reliable after it starts disclosing CAMs. 
Although experimental studies suggest that investors may associate CAMs with a lower level of 
audit assurance (Christensen et al. 2014; Kachelmeier et al. 2019), there are several reasons why 
investors may perceive an improvement in audit quality and hence financial reporting reliability 
for a firm that is required to disclose CAMs. First, the discussion between auditors and firm 
                                                 
2 Large accelerated filers are defined as issuers with a public float greater than $700 million as of the last business 
day of the firm’s most recently completed second fiscal quarter. 
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management about CAMs may heighten auditors’ professional skepticism, resulting in greater 
scrutiny of the underlying matters (PCAOB 2017). Second, since auditors are required to disclose 
how they address each CAM, they may be incentivized to use more substantive audit procedures 
(ACCA 2018). The increase in audit quality in turn raises the reliability of financial reporting 
(Teoh and Wong 1993; Gipper et al. 2020). Third, the CAM disclosure requirement may lead 
auditors to examine and strengthen internal controls. In support of this argument, a survey by 
Intelligize finds that during CAM dry-runs, 43% of audit committees identified additional internal 
controls to be implemented, while an additional 19% are considering such changes (Butler 2019). 
With the improvement in internal controls, investors may find the information in unaudited 
financial statements (i.e. 10-Qs) more reliable as well. 
Using the difference-in-differences design, I find that after large accelerated filers start 
disclosing CAMs, their earnings response coefficient (ERCs) for quarterly earnings announcement 
have increased relative to firms that are not required to disclose CAMs. This suggests that investors 
perceive an increase in financial reporting reliability for CAM-disclosing firms. Additionally, I 
find in cross-sectional tests that this increase in ERC is driven by Big-N auditors, indicating that 
the effect stems from higher perceived audit quality. I also find that the increase in ERC is greater 
for large accelerated filers with a higher number of CAMs, which suggests that investors may 
consider CAM disclosure to be an indicator of audit quality.  
My study contributes to two streams of literature. First, I provide new evidence on the 
effects of the expanded auditor’s report. Prior and concurrent research has examined the effects of 
CAM (or KAM) disclosures on investor behavior and market reaction (Christensen et al. 2014; 
Gutierrez et al. 2018; Goh et al. 2019; Kachelmeier et al. 2019; Lennox et al. 2019; Liao et al. 
2019; Filer and Gencer 2020; Burke et al. 2020; Klevak et al. 2020), auditor responses such as 
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audit fee, audit quality, and auditor liability (Brasel et al. 2016; Gimbar et al. 2016; Gutierrez et 
al. 2018; Reid et al. 2019; Burke et al. 2020), and management reporting practices (Burke et al. 
2020; Drake et al. 2020). I add to this literature by presenting empirical evidence that investors 
perceive an increase in financial reporting reliability following CAM disclosure and use CAMs as 
a signal of audit quality. Although Goh et al. (2019) and Reid et al. (2019) also show an increase 
in ERCs after the adoption of KAM disclosure requirements, my study extend their findings by 
showing that investors perceive an increase in reporting reliability not only for audited financial 
statements, but also for quarterly unaudited financial statements. Additionally, I show that 
investors react negatively to CAMs disclosed by firms with a high level of short interest, which 
suggests that investors may use CAMs to confirm their pre-existing opinions about a firm. These 
findings indicate that the CAM disclosures in the U.S. may be informative to investors under 
certain conditions and may improve investor confidence in financial statements. 
Second, I contribute to the literature on the pricing of financial reporting reliability in 
capital markets, as measured by ERCs. Prior research shows that poor audit quality is associated 
with lower ERCs (Moreland 1995; Wilson 2008; Chen et al. 2014; Marshall et al. 2018), and high 
audit quality is associated with high ERCs (Teoh and Wong 1993; Gipper et al. 2020). In particular, 
Gipper et al. (2020) provides evidence that public oversight from the PCAOB increases the 
credibility of audited financial statements. Using the CAM disclosure requirement as an exogenous 
shock, I show that additional disclosures on the audit process also increases the perceived 
reliability of financial statements. This finding implies that policy makers can potentially enhance 
the financial reporting reliability through mandatory disclosure.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional 
background of CAM disclosure, verifies that CAMs contain non-boilerplate information, and 
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discusses the related literature. Section 3 motivates my hypotheses. Sections 4 and 5 present the 
research design, sample selection, and results for each of the two hypotheses, respectively. Section 
4 provides evidence on investor reactions to CAM disclosures. Section 5 analyzes how CAMs 
affect investors’ perception of financial reporting quality. Section 6 presents additional tests, and 
Section 7 concludes. 
2. Background and Related Literature 
2.1 Background 
In line with worldwide efforts to increase the informativeness of the auditor’s report, in 
June 2017, the PCAOB issued Auditing Standard (AS 3101) The Auditor’s Report on an Audit of 
Financial Statements When the Auditor Expresses an Unqualified Opinion. This standard requires 
auditors to communicate critical audit matters (“CAMs”) in the auditor’s report. A CAM is defined 
as any matter arising from the audit of financial statements that “relates to accounts or disclosures 
that are material to the financial statements,” and that “involves especially challenging, subjective, 
or complex auditor judgment” (AS 3101).3 For each CAM communicated in the auditor’s report, 
the auditor must identify the CAM, describe the principal considerations that lead the auditor to 
determine that the matter is a CAM, explain how the CAM was addressed in the audit, and 
reference the relevant financial statement accounts or disclosures. The requirement to disclose 
CAMs in the auditor’s report is effective for large accelerated filers for fiscal years ending on or 
                                                 
3 The standard (AS 3101) also includes a number of other changes primarily intended to provide additional 
information about the auditor and to improve the readability of the auditor’s report (PCAOB 2017). These changes 
are effective for audits of fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2017. 
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after June 30, 2019, and will take effect for all other companies for fiscal years ending on or after 
December 15, 2020.4 
The CAM disclosure mandate is very similar to the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standard Board (IAASB)’s requirement (ISA 701) for auditors to disclose key audit matters 
(“KAMs”), although there are differences in terms and definitions that could lead to different 
outcomes. The IAASB adopted ISA 701 in 2014, and the requirement to disclose KAMs became 
effective for listed companies starting in 2016. KAMs are defined as the most significant matters 
in the audit of the current period’s financial statements. While this definition is close to that of 
CAMs, the PCAOB narrowed the scope of CAMs to matters that are “material” to financial 
statements as a response to commenter concerns that management could communicate immaterial 
matters that weaken or obscure the auditor’s opinion (PCAOB 2017). Because of the materiality 
component, firms in the U.S. may report a lower number of CAMs than the number of KAMs 
reported by firms in Europe. 
In Table 1, I provide insights on CAMs reported by large accelerated filers through April 
26, 2020. Using data from Audit Analytics, I identify 3,512 CAMs disclosed by 2,109 large 
accelerated filers. As shown in Table 1 Panel A, 51.8% of firms report just one CAM. Only one 
firm reports zero CAMs, while the maximum number of reported CAMs is five. The average 
number of reported CAMs is 1.7, which is considerably lower than the average number of KAMs 
filed in the U.K.5 
                                                 
4 Large accelerated filers are defined as issuers with a public float greater than $700 million as of the last business 
day of the firm’s most recently completed second fiscal quarter. 
5 Guitierrez et al. (2018) reports a mean of 3.97 and a median of 4.00 for KAMs in the audit reports of U.K. listed 
firms between 2014 and 2015. 
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Table 1 Panel B presents the topics that have most frequently been identified as CAMs.6 
The percentage of firms reporting a CAM on business combinations, goodwill, and revenue from 
customer contracts are 19.3%, 18.4%, and 17.6%, respectively. I classify CAM topics into five 
categories (intangibles, revenue recognition, operating accruals, taxes, and other), and document 
in Table 1 Panel C that 40.4% of firms report at least one CAM related to intangibles, 23.5% of 
firms report at least one CAM related to revenue recognition, 38.9% of firms report at least one 
CAM related to operating accruals, and 15.4% of firms report at least one CAM related to taxes.  
There are some commonalities among reported CAMs for firms in the same industry, 
which is not surprising given their exposure to industry-specific risks and accounting rules. For 
example, Table 1 Panel D shows that 64.5% of firms in the consumer nondurables industry report 
CAMs related to intangibles, 49.6% of firms in the business equipment industry report CAMs 
related to revenue recognition, and 68.1% of firms in the utilities industry report CAMs related to 
operating accruals. However, one can still observe considerable variation in the type of CAMs 
reported by firms in the same industry. 
Practitioners and academics have expressed the concern that auditors could disclose 
boilerplate CAMs to avoid legal liability, making the disclosure uninformative to investors. 
Specifically, a CAM related to a litigated issue may increase jurors’ perception that an auditor 
could have foreseen the problem but have missed the litigated issue due to negligence, leading to 
a higher assessment of culpability (Gimbar et al. 2016). This may incentivize auditors to disclose 
boilerplate CAMs that are generic and similar to those disclosed by other firms in the same industry 
                                                 
6 Audit Analytics collects CAM titles from each firm’s audit report, and then classifies these titles by common topic. 
For example, the firm-specific title “valuation of acquired developed product technology intangible assets - BioTek 
acquisition” is grouped under “business combination.” There are 51 unique CAM topics identified by Audit 
Analytics. In this paper, I further classify CAM topics into five broader categories: intangibles, revenue recognition, 
operating accruals, taxes, and other. 
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in order to decrease litigation risk (Davis Polk comment letter). On the other hand, auditors may 
be motivated to disclose meaningful CAMs if they believe that so doing would shield them from 
legal liability in the case of future misstatements. Consistent with this argument, Brasel et al. 
(2016) find in an experimental study that when the auditors failed to detect a misstatement, jurors 
are less likely to find auditors negligent if they have previously disclosed a CAM related to the 
misstated account. 
In Table 1 Panel E, I verify that reported CAMs are not boilerplate by examining the 
association between CAM topics and pre-disclosure characteristics that reflect the complexity and 
subjectivity of a firm’s accounting. Specifically, I run a set of Poisson regressions where the 
dependent variable varies between the total number of CAMs disclosed by each firm and the 
number of CAMs in each of the four major categories (intangibles, revenue recognition, operating 
accruals, and taxes).  Independent variables include a list of firm characteristics that drive certain 
categories of CAM or that reflect the overall business complexity of the firm. I also control for 
factors that may affect auditors’ incentives to report CAMs. All variables are defined in Appendix 
1. If CAMs are boilerplate and do not vary across firms, there should be no significant association 
between the number or topic of CAMs and the corresponding pre-disclosure firm characteristics. 
However, Column (1) shows a positive and significant association between the number of CAMs 
and proxies for the complexity and subjectivity of a firm’s financial reporting (e.g., intangible 
assets, net deferred tax assets, firm size, number of segments, loss, and restatement in the past 
year). Columns (2) to (5) show that the proxies for complexity in intangible assets, revenue 
recognition, and taxes are all positively associated with the number of CAMs in the corresponding 
categories. Overall, the multivariate evidence suggests that CAM disclosures are at least somewhat 
informative and are potentially useful to investors. 
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2.2 Related Literature 
A large body of experimental and empirical research examines the effect of the expanded 
auditor’s report on investor behavior. The findings of experimental studies suggest that CAM (or 
KAM) disclosures affect investors’ investment decisions. For example, Christensen et al. (2014) 
find that when presented with an auditor’s report containing a CAM, nonprofessional investors 
perceive higher misstatement risk, feel less confidence about a firm, and are more likely to stop 
considering the firm as an investment. Similarly, Kachelmeier et al. (2019) find their experimental 
participants to feel less confident about the financial statement area identified as a CAM.  
Empirical studies examining the effect of key audit matters (“KAMs”) in various countries 
have found mixed evidence. Evidence from the United Kingdom suggests that there is no 
significant investor reaction to KAMs (Gutierrez et al. 2018; Lennox et al. 2019), but that the 
expanded audit report requirements are associated with a significant improvement in financial 
reporting quality (Reid et al. 2019). Goh et al. (2019) find that in China, the expanded audit report 
is incrementally informative to investors, resulting in higher abnormal trading volume and earnings 
response coefficients. However, Liao et al. (2019) do not find evidence that KAMs provide 
incremental information or change audit quality in Hong Kong and China. Because of the mixed 
findings in the literature, the unique “materiality” component in the CAM disclosure requirement, 
and the distinct institutional environments, it is ex ante unclear whether CAM disclosures have 
any significant effect in the United States.   
There are four concurrent studies providing empirical evidence on the effect of the CAM 
disclosure requirement in the United States. While Klevak et al. (2020) find a negative association 
between the number and length of CAMs and the stock returns around 10-K filings, Files and 
Gencer (2020) and Burke et al. (2020) both document no significant changes to price or volume 
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reactions or to audit fees for large accelerated filers in the first year of CAM disclosure. Burke et 
al. (2020) also document that CAMs disclosures are not boilerplate, and that there are significant 
changes in the financial statement footnotes referenced by CAMs, suggesting that management 
does change disclosures in response to the CAM mandate. Additionally, Drake et al. (2020) show 
that tax-related CAMs are associated with less tax-related earnings management, indicating that 
the required disclosure may have the indirect effect of constraining management misbehavior.  
My study adds to the literature in two ways. First, I show that although there is no 
significant investor reaction to CAMs on average, investors do react negatively to CAMs when a 
firm has a high level of short interest. This suggests that investors may view CAMs as confirming 
short seller suspicion about a firm, but in the absence of pre-existing concerns, investors may 
believe that auditors have already addressed the disclosed risk. This is one potential explanation 
for the lack of significant market reaction around CAM disclosures. Second, I present empirical 
evidence that investors perceive an increase in financial reporting reliability following CAM 
disclosure and use CAMs as a signal of audit quality. Specifically, I show that when large 
accelerated filers start to report CAMs, there is an increase in ERC for these firms’ subsequent 
quarterly earnings. Although Goh et al. (2019) and Reid et al. (2019) also show an increase in 
ERCs after the adoption of KAM disclosure requirements, my study extend their findings by 
showing that investors perceive an increase in reporting reliability not only for audited financial 
statements, but also for quarterly unaudited financial statements. 
3. Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Investor Reaction to CAM Disclosures 
The primary purpose of the CAM disclosure requirement is to increase the decision 
usefulness of disclosing firms’ financial reports to investors. If the disclosed CAMs provide unique 
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insights on how auditors view and address complex and subjective accounting matters, these 
reports can potentially inform investors’ investment decisions. For example, if investors think that 
an auditor failed to adequately address a CAM, they may expect a restatement to happen in the 
future and incorporate the estimated future cash flow associated with the restatement into the 
pricing of the firm. If investors find a CAM more complicated than they previously thought, they 
can update their beliefs about the riskiness of the firm and about the proper discount rate to use on 
the firm’s valuation.  
However, concurrent archival studies over similar sample periods have not found evidence 
of any incremental information content from CAMs (Burke et al. 2020; Filer and Gencer 2020).7 
There could be several reasons for these findings. First, investors may believe that the disclosed 
risks have been adequately addressed by auditors, and may perceive no change in the riskiness of 
the firm or in the expectation of future cash flows (Gutierrez et al. 2018). Second, investors may 
already know the information conveyed in CAMs (Lennox et al. 2019). Third, investors may not 
understand the implications of CAMs.  
In this paper, I explore the possibility that investors react more strongly to CAMs if the 
disclosed information confirms their pre-existing concerns about a firm’s financial reporting. My 
proxy for these concerns is short interest measured at the end of the fiscal year. Since short sellers 
are professional investors who often anticipate negative future returns and financial statement 
manipulations (Cassell et al. 2011; Dechow et al. 1996; Desai et al. 2006; Efendi and Swanson 
2009; Karpoff and Lou 2010), observing a high level of short interest may increase investor 
                                                 
7 Klevak et al. (2020) find that CAM disclosures are associated with negative stock returns. However, Klevak et al. 
(2020) examine 10-Ks filed between August 2019 and May 2020, while I restrict my sample to 10-Ks filed before 
February 20, 2020 because of the sharp increase in market volatility (VIX index) after COVID-19. The difference in 
sample periods could potentially explain the difference between our results, since stock returns measured after 
February may be affected by news and speculations related to the pandemic. 
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suspicion about a target firm’s financial reporting. This is especially true when activist short sellers 
publish negative reports about a firm (Brendel and Ryans 2020). Ex ante, however, investors 
cannot be certain whether short sellers are right in betting against a firm. In such cases, investors 
may interpret CAMs, which are official disclosures from the auditor describing complex and 
uncertain accounting estimates, as confirmation of short seller suspicions about a firm’s financial 
reporting quality. Investors may then perceive a higher risk of misstatement and react negatively 
to CAM disclosures. Therefore, my first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: Investors react more negatively to CAMs when a firm has high short interest. 
3.2 Change in Investors’ Perception of Firms’ Financial Reporting Reliability  
In addition to making the auditor’s report more informative to investors, the standard-setter 
assert that the communication of CAMs may benefit investors by enhancing audit quality (PCAOB 
2017). If audit quality does improve or if investors perceive an increase in audit quality associated 
with CAM disclosure, then investors will consider audited firms’ financial reporting to be more 
reliable (Teoh and Wong 1993). Moreover, I expect investors to perceive both audited annual 
financial statements (i.e. 10-Ks) and unaudited quarterly financial statements (i.e. 10-Qs) to be 
more reliable after CAM disclosure. 
Investors may find a firm’s audited financial statements more reliable if they believe that 
the process of identifying and disclosing CAMs leads to an improvement in audit quality. For 
instance, the discussions between auditors and firm management regarding CAMs may heighten 
auditors’ professional skepticism, resulting in greater scrutiny of the underlying matters (PCAOB 
2017). Moreover, since auditors are required to disclose how they address each CAM, they may 
be incentivized to use more substantive audit procedures (ACCA 2018). If an auditor closely 
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scrutinizes a CAM and does not find fault with the firm’s accounting, investors may feel more 
confident that the audited financial data accurately reflect the economic value of the firm. 
Investors may also perceive a firm’s unaudited quarterly financial statements to be more 
reliable because the CAM disclosure requirement may lead auditors to examine and strengthen 
internal controls. Consistent with this view, a survey by Intelligize finds that during CAM dry-
runs, 43% of audit committees identified additional internal controls to be implemented, while an 
additional 19% are considering such changes (Butler 2019). The improvement in internal controls 
may alleviate the concern of financial manipulation and increase the accuracy of financial reports. 
Thus investors may find the information in both audited and unaudited quarterly financial 
statements to be more reliable. 
On the other hand, investors may rely less on a firm’s financial reporting if they 
misinterpret CAMs as reducing the level of audit assurance. In identifying a CAM, auditors are 
essentially declaring that an account is discretionary and difficult to audit. When provided with 
such information, investors may associate CAMs with less audit assurance and could perceive 
related accounts as less reliable. Indeed, experimental studies find that investors have lower 
confidence in a firm’s financial statement when it contains CAMs (Christensen et al. 2014; 
Kachelmeier et al. 2019). However, this confidence-reducing effect is moderated by the inclusion 
of a resolution section where auditors discuss the procedures used to address the CAMs 
(Christensen et al. 2014). 
Finally, it is possible that CAMs have no effect on investors’ perception of firms’ financial 
reporting reliability. This could happen if the CAM contains information that is generic or already 
known by investors. Alternatively, investors may perceive no connection between CAM disclosure 
and audit quality, especially when the CAM section of the auditor’s report begins with the 
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statement that “the communication of critical audit matters does not alter in any way [the auditor’s] 
opinion on the financial statements” (PCAOB 2017). Under this interpretation, investors should 
not perceive any change in the reliability of a firm’s financial reporting. 
Since investors’ beliefs are not directly observable, I study the ERCs around the quarterly 
earnings announcements following the release of the 10-Ks containing CAMs. Prior research 
shows that investor response to earnings surprise increases with perceived auditor quality (Teoh 
and Wong 1993; Gipper et al. 2020). In the case of CAM disclosure, there could be an increase in 
ERC if investors associate CAMs with higher audit quality. However, there could be a decrease in 
ERC if investors interpret CAMs as lowering the level of audit assurance. There could also be no 
change in ERC if CAMs have no effect on investors’ perception of audit quality. My third 
hypothesis is therefore: 
Hypothesis 2: Investors respond more to a firm’s reported earnings after the firm starts reporting 
CAMs.  
4. Investor Reaction to CAMs 
4.1 Research Design 
To examine investor reaction to CAM disclosures, I implement a difference-in-differences 
design where the treatment group consists of large accelerated filers and the control group consists 
of firms in other filer categories. Specifically, since the CAM disclosure requirement has become 
effective for large accelerated filers for fiscal years ending on or after June 30, 2019, but does not 
apply to other firms until December 15, 2020, the large accelerated filers are the only firms filing 
10-Ks containing CAMs during fiscal year 2019. This enables me to examine the change in the 
CAM-disclosing firms’ investor reaction from the pre-period to the post-period relative to a set of 
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control firms that do not disclose CAMs. First, to verify the prior paper’s finding that there is no 
significant market reaction to CAMs on average, I estimate the following regression: 
𝐴𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 + ∑𝛽𝐽𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                               
(1a) 
where ABRET is abnormal stock return calculated as the sum of market-adjusted stock returns 
over the three-day event window surrounding a firm’s 10-K filing date. 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 is an indicator 
variable equal to one for large accelerated filers required to disclose CAM during the phase-in 
period, and zero otherwise. 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 is an indicator equal to one for fiscal years that end on or after 
June 30, 2019, and zero otherwise. The main variable of interest, 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖, captures the 
impact of CAM disclosures on the outcome variables. Instead of including 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 and 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡  
separately in the regression, I use firm and month fixed effects to control for unobservable firm-
level characteristics and time-varying heterogeneity. 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡 represents the control 
variables defined in Appendix 1, including firm size (SIZE), market-to-book ratio (BTM), return 
on assets (ROA), an indicator for negative earnings (LOSS), leverage (LEV), big-N auditor 
(BIGN), analyst following (LN_ANALYST), percentage of institutional ownership (INSTOWN), 
average stock return volatility (VOLATILITY), average turnover (TURNOVER), and the number 
of days between the earnings announcement and the 10-K filing date (DAYSAFTEREA).  
 The key identifying assumption for consistency of the difference-in-differences estimator 
is the parallel trends assumption, which requires that the average change in outcome variables is 
the same for both the treatment and control groups in the absence of treatment (Roberts and 
Whited, 2013). Verifying this assumption is particularly important in my setting because the 
treatment firms, which are large accelerated filers, have significantly larger market capitalizations 
and operate in richer information environments than do the control firms in other filer categories. 
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To assess the validity of the parallel trends assumption, I plot trends of the counter-factual 
treatment effect on ABRET. Specifically, I replace the 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 indicator in Equation (1a) with 
separate indicators for each fiscal year between FY 2015 and FY 2019 (except for the benchmark 
year of FY 2015). After estimating the modified regression, I map coefficient estimates for the 
interaction of 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 with each fiscal year indicator with 95% confidence intervals. As shown in 
Figure 1, the estimated treatment effects for ABRET are not significantly different from zero 
during the pre-period, indicating that there is no different trends for treatment and control firms 
prior to the treatment. The evidence in Figure 1 also anticipates the result that there are no 
significant reactions to CAM disclosures, as the treatment effects for ABRET are not significantly 
different from zero in the post-treatment period of FY 2019.  
Next, to examine whether investors react negatively to CAMs disclosed by firms with high 
levels of short interests, I add an indicator variable for high level of short interest and its interaction 
with 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 and 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 to the difference-in-differences model. The new regression specification 
is as follows: 
𝐴𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 ∗
𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝛽𝐽𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                      (1b)                                                                   
where 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable equals to one if the short interest for a firm-year is 
higher than the sample median of that particular fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Short interest for 
each firm-year is computed as the number of shares held short scaled by total shares outstanding. 
All other variables are defined as in Equation (1a).  
 The main variable of interest is 𝛽1, the coefficient of 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡, 
which captures the incremental investor reaction to CAMs for treatment firms with higher levels 
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of short interests. If investors perceive CAMs as negative news for firms targeted by short sellers, 
then 𝛽1 would be negative.  
 To verify that short interest does not affect the outcome variables in the absence of CAM 
disclosure, I plot trends for the incremental treatment effect of short interest on ABRET. First, I 
replace the 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 indicator in Equation (1b) with separate indicators for each fiscal year between 
FY 2015 and FY2019, except for the benchmark year of 2015. After estimating the modified 
regression, I map coefficient estimates for the interaction of 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡 with each 
fiscal year indicator with 95% confidence intervals. As shown in Figure 2, the estimated 
incremental treatment effects for ABRET during the pre-period are not significantly different from 
zero, indicating that prior to treatment, short interest does not have any incremental effect on 
investor reaction to 10-Ks. Figure 2 also shows that in FY 2019, when treatment firms first start 
reporting CAMs, the incremental treatment effect on ABRET becomes significantly negative. This 
implies that investors react more negatively to CAMs when they are already suspicious about a 
firm’s financial reporting, proxied for by a firm’s high level of short interest.  
4.2 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 Panel A presents the sample selection procedure for the difference-in-difference 
analysis. I start from all U.S. firms on Compustat between fiscal years 2017 and 2019 with primary 
stocks listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX, restrict the sample to nonfinancial firms (i.e., I 
exclude firms with SIC codes 6000 to 6999), and eliminate firm-years with missing data for 
outcome or for control variables. I then merge these data with Calcbench to obtain the 10-K filing 
date that corresponds to each firm-year. In order to avoid the period of high volatility caused by 
COVID-19 and the confounding effects on the outcome variables, I eliminate firms that filed their 
FY 2019 10-Ks after February 20, 2020. I also eliminate firms that do not file a 10-K on or after 
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June 30, 2019, which is the effective date of the CAM disclosure requirement. I require all firms 
in the sample to have at least one observation in the pre- and in the post-treatment periods. Finally, 
I exclude two non-large accelerated filers that voluntarily disclosed CAMs. This results in a pre-
matching sample of 758 firms, with 542 treatment and 216 control firms.8  
Table 2 Panel B provides the descriptive statistics for the 2,237 firm-year observations in 
the full sample. For sample firms, the average log market value of equity is 7.70 (equivalent to 
$2,208 million), the twenty-fifth percentile is 6.26 (equivalent to $523 million), and the seventy-
fifth percentile is 9.28 (equivalent to $10.7 billion). The standard deviation for firm size is 2.28. 
The large variation in size across the sample is expected because the treatment group consists of 
large accelerated filers while the control group includes firms in other filer categories which are 
smaller by definition. The average firm has a market-to-book ratio of 4.26 and a return-on-asset 
ratio of 0.2%, suggesting that sample firms are generally profitable. The mean standard deviation 
for abnormal daily returns is 2.1% for the 250 trading days prior to the release of the 10-Ks. The 
average turnover is 0.9%. These statistics are comparable to those in the literature. 
4.3 Results and Analysis 
Table 3 shows the difference-in-difference regression results for Hypotheses 1. Column (1) 
shows the result from estimating Equation (1a), where ABRET is regressed on POST*TREAT and 
on control variables with firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. The 
coefficient on POST*TREAT remains statistically insignificant (0.007, p > 0.10). Based on these 
results, there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that on average, CAM disclosures 
                                                 
8 There are fewer control than treatment firms because large accelerated filers are required to file their 10-Ks within 
a shorter timeframe than firms in other filer categories (i.e., large accelerated filers are required to file 10-Ks no later 
than 60 days after the fiscal year end, accelerated filers should file no later than 75 days after the fiscal year end, and 
non-accelerated filers should file no later than 90 days after the fiscal year end). Thus, many control firms filed 10-
Ks for fiscal year 2019 after February 20, 2020, and are not included in the sample. 
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have no effect on abnormal stock returns around 10-K releases. This is consistent with concurrent 
studies finding that CAM disclosures do not prompt any abnormal investor reaction in terms of 
stock returns.  
Columns (2) presents the results from estimating Equation (1b), which examines investors’ 
reaction to the CAM disclosures of firms targeted by short sellers. When ABRET is regressed on 
the indicator for high short interest (HIGH_SHORT) and on its interactions with POST and 
TREAT, the coefficient on the main variable of interest, POST*TREAT*HIGH_SHORT, is 
negative and significant at the 1% level (-0.052, p < 0.01). This implies that investors view CAMs 
as confirming their pre-existing suspicions about a firm’s financial reporting, and thus they react 
negatively to CAMs disclosed by firms with higher levels of short interest. Additionally, the 
coefficient on POST*TREAT is positive and significant at the 5% level (0.026, p < 0.05). This is 
potentially because investors believe that auditors have addressed CAMs and ensured more 
reliable financial reporting for firms with low short interests.   
In sum, I find that while there is no incremental stock return reaction to CAMs on average, 
investors react negatively to CAMs disclosed by firms with high levels of short interest. These 
findings are consistent with my hypothesis that investors’ reaction to CAMs vary with their pre-
existing perception about a firm. 
5. Effect of CAMs on Perceived Financial Reporting Reliability 
5.1 Research Design 
To examine whether CAMs affect how investors perceive disclosing firms’ financial 
reporting reliability, I combine the ERC regression with a difference-in-difference design 
following Ferri et al. (2018). Using this design, I am able to mitigate the concern that changes in 
ERC are caused by factors unrelated to CAMs.  
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The intuition behind my difference-in-difference regression is that investors learn about 
CAMs from the FY 2019 10-K filings of large accelerated filers, and update their beliefs about 
firms’ financial reporting quality for the subsequent earnings announcements. If investors perceive 
earnings as more reliable after they learn about CAMs, they will react more strongly to earnings 
surprise, resulting in a higher average ERC around earnings announcements after the FY 2019 10-
K filing date. I therefore estimate the following regression:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +
∑𝛽𝑘𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                   (2)  
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the three-day market-adjusted stock return around the date of the quarterly 
earnings announcements. 𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is unexpected earnings, computed by taking the difference 
between quarterly earnings per share and the median of one-quarter-ahead analyst forecasts of 
quarterly earnings per share, and then scaling the difference by stock price two days before the 
earnings announcement date. 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to one for large accelerated 
filers that are required to disclose CAM for fiscal years ending on or after June 30, 2019, and 
zero otherwise. 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to one for earnings announcements that 
take place on or after the respective firm’s FY 2019 10-K filing date, and zero otherwise. The 
interaction term, 𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡, captures the incremental change in ERCs for 
treatment firms relative to control firms from the pre- to post-treatment period. To ensure that the 
tests are less likely to capture the effect of any earlier events, I restrict the sample period to fiscal 
years 2019 and 2020, which include the quarters right before and after the implementation of the 
CAM disclosure requirement. 
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Following prior literature (Collins and Kothari 1989, Easton and Zmijewski 1989, Ferri et 
al. 2018, Gipper et al. 2020), I include firm characteristics and their interactions with UE to control 
for factors that affect ERCs, including firm size (SIZE), growth opportunities (MTB), leverage 
(LEV), stock covariation with the market return (BETA), a loss indicator (LOSS), analyst forecast 
dispersion (DISP), and the degree of persistence in earnings (PERS). To control for the influence 
of different industries and fiscal quarters on ERC, I include industry fixed effects (using the Fama 
French 48 industries specification), fiscal year-quarter fixed effects, and their interaction with UE. 
Standard errors are clustered by earnings announcement dates to account for cross-sectional 
dependencies among firms that announce earnings on the same day. In order to mitigate the effect 
of potential outliers in the UE variable, I estimate Equation (2) using a robust regression that places 
less weight on observations with high leverage or with large absolute residuals. 
I perform two additional tests to verify whether changes in ERC are driven by CAM 
disclosure. The first test exploits variation in ex-ante auditor skill across sample firms. For 
investors to believe that a firm’s financial reporting is more reliable, these investors must consider 
an auditor skillful enough to improve audit quality through the CAM disclosure process. A skillful 
auditor may use more substantive audit procedures and enhance internal controls to address CAMs 
and reduce the likelihood of misreporting, while a less skillful auditor may be incapable of 
effectively auditing these complex matters or identifying the necessary internal control 
improvements. Therefore, ex-ante auditor skills should be positively correlated with the effect of 
CAM on ERCs. Using an indicator variable for a Big-N auditor in order to proxy for auditor skills 
and resources, I add to Equation (2) the indicator BIGN and its interactions with UE, POST, and 
TREAT (i.e., UE*BIGN*POST*TREAT, UE*BIGN*POST, UE*BIGN*TREAT, BIGN*POST, 
and BIGN*TREAT). I expect a positive coefficient on UE*BIGN*POST*TREAT. 
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The second test explores cross-sectional variation within treatment firms. If the change in 
ERC is caused by CAMs, the magnitude of change should be positively correlated with the number 
of CAMs disclosed. Specifically, if investors believe that an auditor disclosing a higher number of 
CAMs have conducted a more thorough examination of a firm’s subjective and complex accounts, 
then they may find a firm’s reporting more reliable when its auditor discloses a higher number of 
CAMs. On the other hand, if investors associate CAMs with lower audit assurance, then a higher 
number of CAMs should reflect a lower level of reporting reliability. To test this, I replace TREAT 
in Equation (2) with the number of CAMs (NCAM). The regression model is estimated with only 
the treatment firms, and the key variable of interest is UE*NCAM*POST. I expect the coefficient 
on UE*NCAM*POST to be positive. 
5.2 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 Panel A presents the sample selection procedure for the earnings response 
coefficient analysis. I start from all U.S. firms on Compustat Quarterly between fiscal years 2019 
and 2020 with primary stocks listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX. The sample period is then 
restricted to the fiscal quarters right before and after the implementation of the CAM disclosure 
requirement so that the tests are less likely to capture the effect of any earlier events. Next, I restrict 
the sample to nonfinancial firms with their 2019 fiscal years ending on or after June 30, 2019, keep 
firm-quarters with non-missing data for the full panel, and only retain firms that announced 
quarterly earnings after the FY 2019 10-K filing date and before February 20, 2020. These 
restrictions ensure that investors of treatment firms have access to CAMs disclosed in the FY 2019 
10-K filings before they process subsequent earnings announcement information. Earnings 
announcements after February 20, 2020 are excluded in order to avoid the period of high volatility 
and uncertainty caused by COVID-19. Finally, I require firms to have at least one earnings 
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announcement before the FY 2019 10-K filing date to ensure that they have observations in the 
pre- and in the post-periods. The resulting sample consists of 346 unique firms, with 268 treatment 
and 78 control firms. 
The descriptive statistics for this sample are shown in Table 4 Panel B. The average market-
adjusted stock return around earnings announcements (CAR) is 0.13%, and the average 
unexpected earnings (UE) is 0.0005, which are comparable with those in prior literature. Table 4 
Panel C provides the differences in mean between treatment and control firms. The average log 
market value of equity is 8.66 (equivalent to $5,768 million) for treatment firms and 5.71 
(equivalent to $302 million) for control firms. The considerable difference in size is expected 
because all treatment firms are large accelerated filers, and are more sizable than control firms by 
definition. As compared to an average control firm, an average treatment firm has a significantly 
higher market-to-book ratio (MTB), higher leverage (LEV), higher beta (BETA), lower loss 
(LOSS), lower analyst forecast dispersion (DISP), lower earnings persistence (PERS), and a higher 
likelihood of having a Big-N auditor (BIGN).  
5.3 Results and Analysis 
Table 5 shows the difference-in-difference regression results. Column (1) provides the 
result when CAR is regressed on POST, TREAT, POST*TREAT, and their interactions with UE. 
Control variables, industry and fiscal-quarter fixed effects, and their respective interactions with 
UE are included. Standard errors are clustered by earnings announcement date. The main variable 
of interest, UE*POST*TREAT is positive and significant (3.053, p < 0.01), suggesting that 
investors react more to surprise earnings of treatment firms in the post-treatment period than to the 
surprise earnings of control firms. 
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Column (2) shows the result for a modified Equation (2) with BIGN and its interactions 
with UE, POST, and TREAT. The coefficient on UE*BIGN*POST*TREAT is positive and 
significant at the 5% level (22.220, p < 0.05), indicating that among treatment firms, ERC increases 
more for firms audited by Big-N auditors. Interestingly, the coefficient on UE*POST*TREAT is 
negative and significant at the 5% level (-18.355, p < 0.05), suggesting that treatment firms audited 
by non-Big-N auditors experience a decrease in ERC relative to control firms. A possible 
explanation is that investors believe that skillful auditors are able to improve audit quality and 
internal controls through the process of CAM disclosure, but that less skilled auditors are unable 
to adequately address the CAMs. Thus, investors rely more on financial information from 
treatment firms audited by Big-N auditors, but become less confident about the financials of 
treatment firms audited by smaller auditors.  
Column (3) presents the result for the cross-sectional test where TREAT is replaced with 
NCAM. Since NCAM is only reported by treatment firms, this regression is estimated using only 
treatment observations. The key variable of interest, UE*POST*NCAM, has a positive coefficient 
that is significant at the 5% level (3.885, p < 0.05). This suggests that among treated firms, 
investors consider those with higher numbers of CAMs to have a greater improvement in financial 
reporting reliability during the post-treatment period. Investors seem to associate a higher number 
of CAMs with greater auditor scrutiny and effort. 
The evidence from Table 5 suggests that CAM disclosures make investors perceive audited 
firms’ financial reporting as more reliable. Additional tests further confirm that the increase in 
ERC is a result of CAM disclosure and changes in perceived audit quality. 
6. Additional Analyses 
6.1 Propensity Score Matched Analysis 
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In order to mitigate the concern that my results are driven by observable differences 
between the treatment and control firms, I re-estimate the difference-in-differences regressions for 
both Hypotheses using propensity-score-matched samples. Due to the way the CAM disclosure 
requirement was implemented, the treatment group consists of large accelerated filers while the 
control group consists of firms in other filer categories. Thus, the treatment firms have significantly 
larger market capitalizations and operate in richer information environments than do the control 
firms. Since firm size and information environment are both important factors that may affect 
investor reaction to firms’ 10-K filings, I form a matched sample where the treatment and control 
groups are more comparable along these dimensions.   
 I start by constructing a propensity score for each firm based on its industry (defined using 
two-digit SIC industry codes), size, number of analysts following, and percentage of institutional 
ownership during the pre-treatment period. I then perform a one-to-one nearest neighbor matching 
with replacement, imposing a caliper distance of 0.50.9  
The propensity-score-matched sample for Hypothesis 1 comprises of 82 treatment and 26 
control firms. Compared to the full sample, the matched sample contains smaller firms in the 
treatment group and larger firms in the control group that are more comparable in size and 
information environment. As shown in Table 6 Panel A, the average log market value of equity in 
the matched sample is 7.01 (equivalent to $1,108 million). The twenty-fifth percentile is 6.65 
(equivalent to $773 million), which is slightly larger than that of the full sample, and the seventy-
fifth percentile is 7.49 (equivalent to $1,790 million), which is considerably smaller than that of 
                                                 
9 Due to the small number of control firms in my sample, matching with replacement allows me to form a larger 
matched sample compared to matching without replacement. In addition, Roberts and Whited (2013) recommends 
matching with replacement, as it allows for better matches and less bias. Due to the lack of overlap between the 
treatment and control groups, a larger than normal caliper distance is necessary for me to form a reasonably sized 
sample after matching. 
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the full sample. This is because the largest treatment (smallest control) firms are dropped from the 
sample due to a lack of matching control (treatment) firms. Table 6 Panel B shows that although 
the matched treatment firms are still significantly larger than the matched control firms, the 
difference in mean size has dropped from 4.03 in the full sample to 0.83 in the matched sample. 
Similarly, the difference in the mean log number of analysts has dropped from 1.61 to 0.42, and 
the difference in mean institutional ownership has dropped from 36% to 12%. Additionally, the 
difference in the means of most variables (including short interest, market-to-book, return on 
assets, loss, and leverage) become statistically insignificant in the matched sample. This suggests 
that treatment and control firms in the matched sample are more comparable, and there is a higher 
likelihood that investors’ reaction to these firms’ 10-Ks will follow the same trend.  
Table 6 Panel C presents the results from estimating Equations (1a) and (1b) using the 
matched sample. The findings are largely the same as those from the full sample: On average, there 
is no abnormal stock return reaction to 10-Ks containing CAMs. However, Column (2) shows that 
investors react negatively to CAMs when a firm has a high level of short interest (the coefficient 
on POST*TREAT*HIGH_SHORT is -0.146, p < 0.05).  
The propensity-score-matched sample for Hypothesis 2 consists of 35 treatment and 16 
control firms. As shown in Table 7 Panel A, the average log market value of equity in the matched 
sample is 6.93 (equivalent to $1,022 million), which is much smaller than that of the full sample 
(8.04, equivalent to $3,102 million). Table 7 Panel B shows that the difference in mean size 
between the treatment and control firms has dropped from 2.95 in the full sample to 0.65 in the 
matched sample. The difference in other firm characteristics have also reduced to various extents, 
suggesting that treatment and control firms in the matched sample are more comparable. Because 
investors in firms of similar sizes and information environments may respond to unexpected 
28 
 
earnings in a similar way, the matched sample alleviate the concern that the change in ERC is due 
to any systematic change in firm characteristics.  
Table 7 Panel C presents the results from estimating Equations (2) using the matched 
sample. The sign and significance of the key coefficients are similar to those form the full sample. 
Column (1) shows an increase in ERC after firms start reporting CAMs (the coefficient on 
UE*POST*TREAT is 10.313, p < 0.01). Column (2) shows that the increase in ERC is driven by 
Big-N auditors. Column (3) shows that among treatment firms, the ones reporting more number 
of CAMs experience a greater increase in ERC. 
The fact that the matched-sample results are consistent with the full-sample results 
provides some assurance that the results are not driven by observable differences between the 
treatment and control groups. 
6.2 Change in Short Interest around 10-K Filing 
An alternative explanation for the investor reaction results in Table 3 is that short sellers 
use CAMs as an excuse to push down the stock price. That is, the negative and significant 
coefficient on POST*TREAT*HIGH_SHORT is attributable to short sellers further increasing 
short interest after treatment firms reported CAMs. If that is the case, then one cannot infer from 
the regression results that CAMs provide useful information to investors. 
To test the validity of the alternative explanation, I examine the change in short interest 
around 10-K filings in a difference-in-difference regression. Because the stock exchanges disclose 
short interests on the fifteenth and the end of each month, I measure the change in short interest 
from the last available report before to the first available report after the 10-K filing date. Table 8 
displays the result of regressing the change in short interest (ΔSHORT) on POST, TREAT, 
HIGH_SHORT, and their interactions. In Column (1), the coefficient on POST*TREAT is zero 
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and statistically insignificant. In Column (2), the coefficients on POST*TREAT*HIGH_SHORT 
is also statistically insignificant, suggesting that even for treatment firms with high level of short 
interest, there is no significant change in short interest around the 10-K filing date relative to the 
control firms. Therefore, the negative return observed in the main tests are not a result of short 
sellers’ manipulation. 
6.3 Falsification Test Using B/P Ratio  
Another concern is that firms with high levels of short interests are likely to be overvalued, 
and the negative stock return I observe could be due to market correction. To mitigate this concern, 
I re-estimate Equation (1b) using the book-to-price ratio (B/P) in place of HIGH_SHORT. B/P 
ratio is calculated as the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. A low B/P ratio 
indicates overvaluation, and there is indeed a negative and significant correlation (-0.06, p < 0.01) 
between B/P and short interest in my sample. If the negative stock return were due to 
overvaluation, I should observe a negative and significant coefficient on 
POST*TREAT*LOW_BP. 
 Table 9 shows the results from estimating Equation (1b). Column (1) shows the result 
from regressing abnormal stock return around 10-K filings on POST, TREAT, and their 
interactions with B/P. The coefficient on POST*TREAT*B/P is 0.006 and statistically 
insignificant. In Column (2), abnormal stock return is regressed on POST, TREAT, and their 
interaction with LOW_B/P, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the B/P ratio of a firm-
year is lower than the sample median of that fiscal year. The coefficient on 
POST*TREAT*LOW_BP is -0.006 and statistically insignificant. Using P/E ratio as an alternative 
proxy yields similar results. These findings alleviate the concern that the investor reactions 




In this paper, I examine whether investors react to CAM disclosures and whether they 
perceive any change in adopting firms’ financial reporting quality. Using a difference-in-
differences design, I find investors react negatively to CAMs disclosed by firms with high levels 
of short interest. I also find a significant increase in the quarterly earnings response coefficient for 
adopting firms after they start to disclose CAMs. The effect is driven by big-N audit firms, and 
increases with the number of CAMs reported. Collectively, the evidence suggests that investors 
use CAMs to confirm their pre-existing opinions about a firm, and that they perceive an 
improvement in audit quality and financial reporting reliability due to the CAM disclosure 
requirement.  
Despite my best efforts, this paper has several limitations. First, the findings of this paper 
may not be representative of the effect of CAMs on smaller firms that have not yet adopted the 
new standard. Due to differences in the information environments of large accelerated filers and 
other firms, the effect may not be the same. Second, the findings are based on a short sample period 
as the CAM disclosure requirement was implemented after June 30, 2019, and I have to restrict 
the sample further to avoid the confounding effects of COVID-19. This limited sample does not 
allow me to examine the long-term outcomes of CAM disclosures. Finally, despite using a 
difference-in-differences design and strict fixed effect specifications, I cannot rule out the 
possibility that my results are driven by factors other than CAM disclosures. The cross-sectional 
tests mitigate, but cannot eliminate this concern.  
Nevertheless, the findings of this paper add to the debate about the usefulness of CAM 
disclosures and highlight different aspects of investor behavior that regulators may want to take 
into account when evaluating the costs and benefits of the CAM disclosure requirement. 
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Figure 1. Parallel Trend: Coefficient Plot for POST*TREAT                                                 
  
 
Figure 2. Parallel Trend: Coefficient Plot for POST*TREAT*HIGH_SHORT 




Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for CAMs  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for CAMs disclosed by large accelerated filers as of April 26, 2020. Panel A 
shows the number of CAMs reported by each firm. Panel B shows the top ten most frequently reported CAM topics. 
The Audit Analytics database provides the topic for each CAM based on its title. For example, the firm-specific title 
“valuation of acquired developed product technology intangible assets - BioTek acquisition” is grouped under the 
topic “business combination.” This paper further classifies CAM topics into five main categories: intangibles, revenue 
recognition, operating accruals, taxes, and other. Panel C shows the number of firms that report each category of 
CAMs. Panel D summarizes the number of firms reporting each category of CAMs by industry (classified using the 
Fama French 12 industries). Panel E presents results from regressing the number of CAMs on firm characteristics that 
reflect the complexity and subjectivity of a firm’s accounting. Because the number of CAMs is a count variable, I use 
a Poisson regression model instead of an OLS regression. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the number of 
CAMs reported (NCAM). In Columns (2), (3), (4), and (5), the dependent variables are the number of CAMs related 
to intangible (INTAN_CAM), revenue recognition (REVREC_CAM), operating accruals (OPACC_CAM), and taxes 
(TAX_CAM), respectively. Industry fixed effects (classified using the Fama French 48 industries) are included in all 
regressions. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors clustered at the 
industry level, are presented below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Number of CAMs Reported by Each Firm 
   
Number of CAMs reported Number of firms % of firms 
0 1 0.0% 
1 1092 51.8% 
2 710 33.7% 
3 240 11.4% 
4 54 2.6% 
5 12 0.6% 
Total 2109 100.0% 
Panel B. Top Ten Most Frequently Reported CAM Topics 
Rank CAM topics Number of firms % of firms 
1 Business combinations 407 19.3% 
2 Goodwill 388 18.4% 
3 Revenue from customer contracts 372 17.6% 
4 Allowance for credit losses 208 9.9% 
5 Other contingent liabilities 187 8.9% 
6 Property, plant, and equipment 173 8.2% 
7 Uncertain tax positions 124 5.9% 
8 Other investments 123 5.8% 
9 Deferred income taxes 114 5.4% 
10 Deferred and capitalized costs 100 4.7% 




Panel C. Frequency of CAM Categories 
CAM categories and main topics Number of firms % of firms 
Intangibles 853 40.4% 
   Business combinations 407 19.3% 
   Goodwill 388 18.4% 
   Other intangible assets 94 4.5% 
Revenue recognition 495 23.5% 
   Revenue from customer contract 372 17.6% 
   Sales return and allowances 79 3.7% 
   Other revenue 47 2.2% 
Operating accruals 821 38.9% 
   Allowance for credit losses 208 9.9% 
   Property, plant, and equipment 173 8.2% 
   Deferred and capitalized costs 100 4.7% 
Taxes 324 15.4% 
   Deferred income tax 114 5.4% 
   Uncertain tax position 124 5.9% 
   Other income tax 92 4.4% 
Other 650 30.8% 
   Other contingent liabilities 186 8.8% 
   Other investments 123 5.8% 
   Policy changes 85 4.0% 










Table 1 Panel D. Frequency of CAM Categories by Industry 
Fama French 12 industries Number of firms Intangibles Revenue recognition Operating accruals Taxes Other 
    N % N % N % N % N % 
Consumer NonDurables 76 49 64.5% 15 19.7% 15 19.7% 18 23.7% 22 28.9% 
Consumer Durables 50 20 40.0% 16 32.0% 18 36.0% 10 20.0% 10 20.0% 
Manufacturing 187 115 61.5% 51 27.3% 34 18.2% 43 23.0% 42 22.5% 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 99 27 27.3% 3 3.0% 36 36.4% 14 14.1% 64 64.6% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 60 33 55.0% 5 8.3% 3 5.0% 21 35.0% 17 28.3% 
Business Equipment 270 104 38.5% 134 49.6% 74 27.4% 70 25.9% 42 15.6% 
Telephone and Television Transmission 58 34 58.6% 15 25.9% 17 29.3% 10 17.2% 16 27.6% 
Utilities 94 33 35.1% 6 6.4% 64 68.1% 7 7.4% 30 31.9% 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 113 56 49.6% 16 14.2% 27 23.9% 20 17.7% 46 40.7% 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 223 75 33.6% 111 49.8% 84 37.7% 32 14.3% 37 16.6% 
Finance 536 165 30.8% 32 6.0% 335 62.5% 33 6.2% 206 38.4% 
Other 330 141 42.7% 91 27.6% 114 34.5% 46 13.9% 105 31.8% 










Table 1 Panel E. Information Content of CAMs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  NCAM INTAN_CAM REVREC_CAM OPACC_CAM TAX_CAM 
      
INTAN 0.434*** 2.224***    
 (6.86) (13.95)    
DR_SALES 0.031  0.625***   
 (0.94)  (3.18)   
ABS_DCA 0.023   -0.100  
 (0.66)   (-0.46)  
DTA 1.501***    7.451*** 
 (4.00)    (4.63) 
SIZE 0.040** -0.014 0.054* -0.068 0.185*** 
 (2.15) (-0.50) (1.73) (-1.20) (3.74) 
LN_AGE 0.030 0.101** -0.088 0.104 0.021 
 (1.15) (2.21) (-0.89) (1.20) (0.14) 
NSEG 0.013*** 0.025*** 0.004 -0.024 0.061*** 
 (3.70) (3.05) (0.28) (-0.95) (2.91) 
MTB -0.000 -0.008** 0.004 -0.004 0.004 
 (-0.41) (-2.25) (1.10) (-0.73) (0.73) 
LEV 0.050 0.158 -0.408 -0.241 0.375 
 (0.73) (1.06) (-1.25) (-0.74) (0.85) 
LOSS 0.145*** 0.135* 0.217** 0.519*** -0.568*** 
 (5.13) (1.89) (2.33) (3.00) (-2.72) 
RES_ACCT 0.110** 0.227*** 0.087 -0.094 0.410* 
 (2.44) (2.85) (0.88) (-0.52) (1.66) 
BIGN -0.075 0.077 -0.054 0.061 -0.411* 
 (-1.61) (0.73) (-0.36) (0.25) (-1.67) 
LN_ANALYSTS -0.022 -0.122** -0.012 0.168 -0.055 
 (-0.72) (-2.20) (-0.13) (1.46) (-0.43) 
INSTOWN_PERC 0.027 -0.086 0.237 0.090 -0.271 
 (0.42) (-0.70) (1.30) (0.39) (-0.81) 
Constant 0.221 -1.462*** -15.523*** -0.971* -1.419** 
 (1.40) (-4.10) (-13.78) (-1.86) (-2.35) 
Fixed effect Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry 
Cluster Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry 
N 1025 1025 1025 1025 1025 






Table 2. Investor Reaction Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A presents the sample selection procedure for the analysis of investor reactions around 10-K filings (Hypothesis 
1). Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for this sample. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% levels. 
Panel A. Sample Selection   
  N of obs. 
U.S. firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ (FY=2017, 2018, 2019) 10609 (4085 firms) 
Less:  
Firms in the financial industry 8412 (3300 firms) 
Firm-years with missing data 7925 (3111 firms) 
Firms that filed FY 2019 10-K after 02/20/2020 3228 (1364 firms) 
Firms that ended FY 2019 before 06/30/2019 2268 (785 firms) 
Firms with less than two firm-year observations 2243 (760 firms) 
Firms that voluntarily disclosed CAMs 2237 (758 firms) 
 
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics 
         
Variables N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
ABRET 2237 0.002 0.069 -0.023 0.001 0.025 
NCAM 1607 1.63 0.74 1 1 2 
HIGH_SHORT 2237 0.50 0.50 0 0 1 
SIZE 2237 7.70 2.28 6.26 7.93 9.28 
MTB 2237 4.26 9.89 1.25 2.28 4.67 
ROA 2237 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.04 0.09 
LOSS 2237 0.24 0.43 0 0 0 
LEV 2237 0.28 0.23 0.10 0.27 0.40 
BIGN 2237 0.77 0.42 1 1 1 
LN_ANALYSTS 2237 1.97 1.01 1.39 2.20 2.77 
INSTOWN_PERC 2237 0.64 0.31 0.37 0.76 0.89 
VOLATILITY 2237 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
TURNOVER 2237 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 






Table 3. Investor Reaction Regression Analysis 
This table presents results from the estimations of Equation (1a) and Equation (1b). TREAT is an indicator variable 
equal to one for large accelerated filers required to disclose CAM during the phase-in period, and zero otherwise. 
POST is an indicator equal to one for fiscal years that end on or after June 30, 2019, and zero otherwise. The dependent 
variable is ABRET, the three-day cumulative market-adjusted stock returns around 10-K filings dates. Column (1) 
shows the result for regressing ABRET on POST*TREAT, controlling for firm characteristics. Column (2) shows the 
results for estimating Equation (1b), where ABRET is regressed on an indicator for high level of short interest 
(HIGH_SHORT) and on its interactions with POST and TREAT. HIGH_SHORT is equal to one if the short interest 
for a firm-year is higher than the sample median of that particular fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Firm and month 
fixed effects are included, and standard errors are clustered by firm in each column. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. t-statistics are presented below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
  ABRET ABRET 
POST*TREAT 0.007 0.026** 
 (0.70) (2.32) 
POST*TREAT*HIGH_SHORT  -0.052*** 
  (-2.90) 
POST*HIGH_SHORT  0.046*** 
  (2.78) 
TREAT*HIGH_SHORT  0.004 
  (0.25) 
HIGH_SHORT  -0.015 
  (-0.94) 
SIZE -0.020*** -0.021*** 
 (-2.68) (-2.82) 
MTB 0.000 0.000 
 (1.34) (1.34) 
ROA -0.004 -0.002 
 (-0.14) (-0.07) 
LOSS -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.31) (-0.30) 
LEV -0.022 -0.019 
 (-0.83) (-0.75) 
BIGN 0.032 0.035 
 (1.21) (1.35) 
LN_ANALYSTS -0.008 -0.007 
 (-0.92) (-0.85) 
INSTOWN_PERC 0.004 0.006 
 (0.35) (0.54) 
VOLATILITY -0.714 -0.633 
 (-1.60) (-1.45) 




 (0.29) (0.26) 
DAYS_AFTER_EA -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.21) (-0.15) 
Constant 0.163*** 0.165*** 
 (2.62) (2.67) 
Fixed effect Firm, Month Firm, Month 
Cluster Firm Firm 
N 2236 2236 






Table 4. Perceived Reporting Reliability Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of this table presents the sample selection procedure for the analysis of the change in investors’ perception of 
financial reporting reliability. Panel B provides the descriptive statistics for this sample. Panel C presents the 
difference in means between the treatment and the control group. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A. Sample Selection 
  N of obs. 
All U.S. firms on Compustat Quarterly (FY= 2019, 2020) 46331 (9329 firms) 
Keep:  
Nonfinancial firms that ended FY 2019 on or after 06/30/2019 12176 (2556 firms) 
Firm-quarters with missing data needed for ERC regression 7071 (2064 firms) 
Firms announcing quarterly earnings after the FY 2019 10-K filing date and 
before 02/20/2020 1577 (355 firms) 
Firms with at least one earnings announcement before FY 2019 10-K filing date 1562 (346 firms) 
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics 
  N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
CAR 1562 0.0011 0.0853 -0.0434 0.0015 0.0493 
UE 1562 0.0005 0.0067 -0.0002 0.0006 0.0021 
SIZE 1562 8.04 1.69 6.94 8.12 9.14 
MTB 1562 4.03 6.35 1.48 2.46 5.30 
LEV 1562 0.59 0.26 0.40 0.58 0.73 
BETA 1562 1.08 0.43 0.78 1.04 1.35 
LOSS 1562 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 
DISP 1562 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PERS 1562 0.38 0.24 0.18 0.41 0.57 
BIGN 1562 0.84 0.37 1 1 1 
NCAM 1237 1.68 0.79 1 1 2 
Panel C. Difference in Means between Treatment and Control Groups 
  N Mean N Mean Diff in Mean 
CAR 1237 -0.0008 325 0.0081 -0.009* 
UE 1237 0.0007 325 -0.0002 0.0008** 
SIZE 1237 8.66 325 5.71 2.95*** 
MTB 1237 4.30 325 3.03 1.27*** 
LEV 1237 0.61 325 0.49 0.13*** 
BETA 1237 1.10 325 0.97 0.13*** 
LOSS 1237 0.19 325 0.35 -0.15*** 
DISP 1237 0.003 325 0.005 -0.002*** 
PERS 1237 0.36 325 0.46 -0.11*** 




Table 5. Perceived Reporting Reliability Regression Analysis 
This table presents results from the estimation of Eq. (2). I regress the three-day cumulative market-adjusted returns 
around earnings announcements (CAR) on unexpected earnings (UE), an indicator for treatment firms (TREAT), an 
indicator for the treatment period (POST), the interaction of POST*TREAT, control variables, year-quarter fixed 
effects, industry fixed effects, and on the interactions of UE with control variables, year-quarter fixed effects, industry 
fixed effects and treatment indicators. In order to mitigate the effect of outliers, I use a robust regression instead of an 
OLS regression. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors clustered at the 
earnings announcement date level, are presented below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * indicates significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  CAR CAR CAR 
UE*POST*TREAT 3.053*** -18.355**  
 (2.67) (-1.99)  
UE*TREAT 1.966 13.571***  
 (1.32) (3.62)  
UE*POST -1.760 -1.502 -5.130* 
 (-1.29) (-1.11) (-1.66) 
UE 19.209 19.042 -30.707*** 
 (1.38) (1.33) (-3.60) 
UE*BIGN*POST*TREAT  22.220**  
  (2.40)  
UE*POST*NCAM   3.885** 
   (2.49) 
UE*NCAM   -0.038 
   (-0.04) 
UE*SIZE 0.722* 0.820** 0.806* 
 (1.93) (2.19) (1.70) 
UE*MTB -0.002 -0.024 0.006 
 (-0.08) (-0.84) (0.06) 
UE*LEV -1.212 -0.827 -1.138 
 (-1.11) (-0.81) (-0.55) 
UE*BETA -3.237*** -2.327*** -1.576 
 (-3.57) (-2.72) (-1.17) 
UE*LOSS -2.996*** -2.758*** -1.614* 
 (-4.25) (-4.14) (-1.68) 
UE*DISP -66.636*** -38.926** -172.811*** 
 (-4.38) (-1.98) (-3.37) 
UE*PERS 1.368 1.321 2.373* 
 (1.28) (1.26) (1.71) 
Constant -0.042* -0.045* 0.056*** 
 (-1.74) (-1.70) (3.59) 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes 




Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects * UE Yes Yes Yes 
Indicators POST, TREAT Yes Yes Yes 
POST*TREAT Yes Yes No 
BIGN No Yes No 
BIGN*UE No Yes No 
BIGN interaction with POST, TREAT No Yes No 
BIGN*UE interaction with POST, TREAT No Yes No 
Replace TREAT with NCAM No No Yes 
N 1555 1555 1229 






Table 6. Propensity Score Matched Analysis: Investor reaction 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the propensity-score-matched sample. Panel B presents the difference in 
means between the treatment and control group for the full sample and the matched sample. Panel C presents results 
from the estimations of Equation (1a) and Equation (1b). TREAT is an indicator variable equal to one for large 
accelerated filers required to disclose CAM during the phase-in period, and zero otherwise. POST is an indicator equal 
to one for fiscal years that end on or after June 30, 2019, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is ABRET, the 
three-day cumulative market-adjusted stock returns around 10-K filings dates. Column (1) shows the result for 
regressing ABRET on POST*TREAT, controlling for firm characteristics. Column (2) shows the results for estimating 
Equation (1b), where ABRET is regressed on an indicator for high level of short interest (HIGH_SHORT) and on its 
interactions with POST and TREAT. HIGH_SHORT is equal to one if the short interest for a firm-year is higher than 
the sample median of that particular fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Firm and month fixed effects are included, and 
standard errors are clustered by firm in each column. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. t-statistics are presented 
below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.All 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. ***, **, * indicates 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics for Propensity Score Matched Sample 
 
  N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
ABRET 322 0.002 0.075 -0.031 -0.002 0.026 
NCAM 248 1.53 0.72 1 1 2 
HIGH_SHORT 322 0.63 0.48 0 1 1 
SIZE 322 7.01 0.72 6.65 7.11 7.49 
MTB 322 3.58 8.32 1.36 2.23 3.80 
ROA 322 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.06 
LOSS 322 0.27 0.45 0 0 1 
LEV 322 0.27 0.24 0.08 0.22 0.41 
BIGN 322 0.77 0.42 1 1 1 
LN_ANALYSTS 322 1.77 0.61 1.39 1.79 2.20 
INSTOWN_PERC 322 0.72 0.28 0.63 0.83 0.91 
VOLATILITY 322 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 
TURNOVER 322 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 






Panel B. Mean Differences between Treatment and Control Firms 
  














ABRET 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.0016 
HIGH_SHORT 0.57 0.32 0.26*** 0.67 0.52 0.15** 
SIZE 8.84 4.81 4.03*** 7.21 6.38 0.83*** 
MTB 4.87 2.71 2.16*** 3.33 4.37 -1.04 
ROA 0.05 -0.12 0.18*** 0.01 0.04 -0.02* 
LOSS 0.15 0.48 -0.32*** 0.27 0.29 -0.02 
LEV 0.32 0.20 0.11*** 0.28 0.23 0.04 
BIGN 0.94 0.34 0.60*** 0.84 0.55 0.30*** 
LN_ANALYSTS 2.42 0.82 1.61*** 1.87 1.45 0.42*** 
INSTOWN_PERC 0.74 0.39 0.36*** 0.75 0.63 0.12*** 
VOLATILITY 0.017 0.033 -0.016*** 0.022 0.025 -0.003*** 
TURNOVER 0.010 0.008 0.001*** 0.010 0.007 0.003*** 






Panel C. Propensity Score Matched Regression Analysis: Investor Reaction 
  (1) (2) 
  ABRET ABRET 
POST*TREAT 0.003 0.085* 
 (0.10) (1.82) 
POST*TREAT*HIGH_SHORT  -0.146** 
  (-2.34) 
POST*HIGH_SHORT  0.129** 
  (2.22) 
TREAT*HIGH_SHORT  0.091** 
  (1.99) 
HIGH_SHORT  -0.106*** 
  (-2.69) 
SIZE -0.003 -0.006 
 (-0.14) (-0.32) 
MTB 0.001* 0.001* 
 (1.73) (1.91) 
ROA 0.059 0.034 
 (0.77) (0.49) 
LOSS 0.013 0.007 
 (0.65) (0.36) 
LEV 0.045 0.052 
 (0.69) (0.96) 
BIGN -0.017 -0.006 
 (-0.43) (-0.16) 
LN_ANALYSTS -0.003 0.002 
 (-0.13) (0.11) 
INSTOWN_PERC 0.022 0.027 
 (0.80) (0.97) 
VOLATILITY -1.528 -1.575 
 (-1.16) (-1.21) 
TURNOVER 2.743 3.457 
 (1.19) (1.54) 
DAYS_AFTER_EA -0.003** -0.003** 
 (-2.16) (-2.62) 
Constant 0.029 0.027 
 (0.21) (0.21) 
Fixed effect Firm, Month Firm, Month 
Cluster Firm Firm 
N 318 318 





Table 7. Propensity Score Matched Analysis: Perceived Reporting Reliability 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the propensity-score-matched sample. Panel B presents the difference in 
means between the treatment and control group for the full sample and the matched sample. Panel C presents results 
from the estimation of Eq. (2). I regress the three-day cumulative market-adjusted returns around earnings 
announcements (CAR) on unexpected earnings (UE), an indicator for treatment firms (TREAT), an indicator for the 
treatment period (POST), the interaction of POST*TREAT, control variables, year-quarter fixed effects, industry fixed 
effects, and on the interactions of UE with control variables, year-quarter fixed effects, industry fixed effects and 
treatment indicators. In order to mitigate the effect of outliers, I use a robust regression instead of an OLS regression. 
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors clustered at the earnings 
announcement date level, are presented below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics         
  N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
CAR 227 0.0021 0.1093 -0.0806 0.0017 0.0780 
UE 227 0.0001 0.0079 -0.0013 0.0010 0.0033 
SIZE 227 6.93 0.65 6.58 6.93 7.41 
MTB 227 2.17 5.55 1.23 2.11 3.56 
LEV 227 0.58 0.29 0.39 0.50 0.77 
BETA 227 1.16 0.44 0.83 1.15 1.45 
LOSS 227 0.31 0.46 0 0 1 
DISP 227 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
PERS 227 0.43 0.22 0.28 0.47 0.61 
BIGN 227 0.76 0.43 1 1 1 
NCAM 156 1.78 0.85 1 2 2 
 
Panel B. Mean Differences between Treatment and Control Groups 














CAR -0.0008 0.0081 -0.0090* -0.0075 0.0233 -0.0310** 
UE 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0008** 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0003 
SIZE 8.66 5.71 2.95*** 7.13 6.48 0.65*** 
MTB 4.30 3.03 1.27*** 1.72 3.17 -1.45** 
LEV 0.61 0.49 0.120*** 0.58 0.59 -0.01 
BETA 1.10 0.97 0.132*** 1.20 1.07 0.13** 
LOSS 0.19 0.35 -0.153*** 0.31 0.31 0.004 
DISP 0.00 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 -0.0008 
PERS 0.36 0.46 -0.11*** 0.43 0.43 -0.003 






Panel C. Propensity Score Matched Regression Analysis: Change in ERC 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  CAR CAR CAR 
UE*POST*TREAT 10.313*** -32.695***  
 (2.71) (-4.24)  
UE*TREAT -21.169*** -6.110  
 (-3.95) (-0.80)  
UE*POST 2.267 7.964* -29.398** 
 (0.57) (1.93) (-2.26) 
UE -68.135** -60.426** -41.122 
 (-2.56) (-2.48) (-0.99) 
UE*BIGN*POST*TREAT  49.357***  
  (4.84)  
UE*POST*NCAM   12.721** 
   (2.57) 
UE*SIZE 12.398*** 8.624*** 5.785 
 (3.70) (2.64) (1.19) 
UE*MTB -0.309 -0.037 0.234 
 (-1.16) (-0.14) (0.64) 
UE*LEV -1.693 2.743 8.707 
 (-0.34) (0.55) (1.14) 
UE*BETA -0.262 -2.714 -5.411 
 (-0.08) (-0.90) (-1.25) 
UE*LOSS 2.907 5.388** 0.147 
 (1.22) (2.46) (0.04) 
UE*DISP -274.987 -349.149** -33.033 
 (-1.64) (-2.44) (-0.18) 
UE*PERS -18.166*** -19.461*** -9.134 
 (-2.78) (-3.15) (-0.98) 
Constant 0.512*** 0.445*** 0.470* 
 (3.08) (3.29) (1.75) 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics * UE Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects * UE Yes Yes Yes 
Indicators POST, TREAT Yes Yes No 
POST*TREAT Yes Yes No 
BIGN No Yes No 
BIGN*UE No Yes No 
BIGN interaction with POST, TREAT No Yes No 
BIGN*UE interaction with POST, TREAT No Yes No 
NCAM No No Yes 
NCAM*UE No No Yes 
Indicators POST, NCAM No No Yes 
NCAM interaction with POST No No Yes 
N 220 208 148 






Table 8. Change in Short Interest around 10-K 
This table presents results from regressing the change in short interest (ΔSHORT) around 10-K filing date on TREAT, 
POST, HIGH_SHORT, and their interactions, controlling for firm characteristics. TREAT is an indicator variable 
equal to one for large accelerated filers required to disclose CAM during the phase-in period, and zero otherwise. 
POST is an indicator equal to one for fiscal years that end on or after June 30, 2019, and zero otherwise. 
HIGH_SHORT is an indicator variable equal to one if the short interest for a firm-year is higher than the sample 
median of that particular fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Column (1) shows the result for regressing ΔSHORT on 
POST*TREAT, controlling for firm characteristics. Column (2) includes the interaction of POST and TREAT with 
HIGH_SHORT. Firm and month fixed effects are included, and standard errors are clustered by firm in each column. 
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. t-statistics are presented below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * indicates 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
  ΔSHORT ΔSHORT 
POST*TREAT 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.40) (-0.32) 
POST*TREAT*HIGH_SHORT  0.002 
  (1.14) 
POST*HIGH_SHORT  -0.001 
  (-0.77) 
TREAT*HIGH_SHORT  0.001 
  (0.26) 
HIGH_SHORT  -0.002 
  (-1.02) 
SIZE -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.33) (-0.24) 
MTB 0.000 0.000 
 (0.56) (0.51) 
ROA 0.003 0.002 
 (0.64) (0.60) 
LOSS -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.55) (-0.50) 
LEV -0.006* -0.006* 
 (-1.93) (-1.86) 
BIGN 0.000 0.000 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
LN_ANALYSTS 0.001 0.001 
 (1.14) (1.18) 
INSTOWN_PERC 0.001 0.001 
 (0.95) (1.13) 
VOLATILITY -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.05) (-0.05) 




 (1.53) (1.72) 
DAYS_AFTER_EA -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.26) (-0.25) 
Constant 0.000 0.000 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Fixed effect Firm, Month Firm, Month 
Cluster Firm Firm 
N 2236 2236 




















Table 9. Falsification Test Using B/P Ratio 
This table presents results from the estimations of Equation (1b), where HIGH_SHORT is replaced with book-to-price 
ratio (B/P) in Column (1) and LOW_B/P in Column (2). LOW_B/P is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a 
firm-year has B/P ratio lower than the sample median for that particular fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Firm and 
month fixed effects are included, and standard errors are clustered by firm in each column. All variables are defined 
in Appendix 1. t-statistics are presented below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
1% and 99%. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
  ABRET ABRET 
POST*TREAT 0.006 0.007 
 (0.37) (0.63) 
POST*TREAT*B/P 0.000  
 (0.02)  
POST*B/P -0.005  
 (-0.31)  
TREAT*B/P -0.013  
 (-0.43)  
B/P 0.017  
 (0.79)  
POST*TREAT*LOW_BP  -0.006 
  (-0.29) 
POST*LOW_BP  0.014 
  (0.74) 
TREAT*LOW_BP  0.018 
  (0.98) 
LOW_BP  -0.014 
  (-0.84) 
SIZE -0.018** -0.022*** 
 (-1.99) (-2.71) 
MTB 0.000 0.000 
 (1.34) (1.31) 
ROA -0.009 -0.006 
 (-0.31) (-0.22) 
LOSS -0.003 -0.002 
 (-0.37) (-0.26) 
LEV -0.020 -0.022 
 (-0.74) (-0.83) 
BIGN 0.031 0.033 
 (1.16) (1.26) 
LN_ANALYSTS -0.008 -0.008 
 (-0.93) (-0.94) 




 (0.37) (0.32) 
VOLATILITY -0.704 -0.704 
 (-1.55) (-1.56) 
TURNOVER 0.166 0.132 
 (0.30) (0.24) 
DAYS_AFTER_EA -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.20) (-0.15) 
Constant 0.141* 0.172*** 
 (1.94) (2.70) 
Fixed effect Firm, Month Firm, Month 
Cluster Firm Firm 
N 2236 2236 
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Appendix. Variable definitions 
Variable name Description Source 
Variables definitions for Table 1 Panel E: 
 
NCAM Number of CAMs reported by a firm. Audit Analytics 
INTAN_CAM Number of CAMs related to intangible assets. Audit Analytics 
REVREC_CAM Number of CAMs related to revenue recognition. Audit Analytics 
OPACC_CAM Number of CAMs related to operating accruals. Audit Analytics 
TAX_CAM Number of CAMs related to taxes. Audit Analytics 
INTAN The sum of intangible assets and goodwill divided by 
total assets. 
Compustat 
DR_SALES Deferred revenue divided by total sales. Compustat 
ABS_DCA Absolute value of discretionary accruals, estimated 
using the Modified Jones Model. 
Compustat 
DTA Net deferred tax asset or liability divided by total 
assets.  
Compustat 
SIZE Natural log of market capitalization. Market 
capitalization is measured at the end of the fiscal year 
and is computed as share price (PRCC_F) times the 
number of shares outstanding (CSHO). 
 
Compustat 
LN_AGE Natural log of firm age. Firm age is defined as the 
number of years a firm has data on Compustat. 
 
Compustat 
NSEG The total number of business segments. Compustat 
segment 
MTB Market-to-book ratio, computed as share price 
(PRCC_F) times the number of common shares 
outstanding (CSHO) divided by the book value of 






LEV Leverage, computed as long-term debt (DLTT) 
divided by total common equity (CEQ). 
Compustat 
ROA Return on asset, computed as net income (NI) divided 
by total assets (AT). 
Compustat 
LOSS An indicator variable equal to one if basic earnings 
per share excluding extraordinary items (EPSFX) is 
less than zero, and zero otherwise. 
 
Compustat 
RES_ACCT An indicator variable equal to one if a firm had a 
restatement within the last year. 
Audit Analytics 
BIGN An indicator variable for a Big-N auditor. Compustat 
LN_ANALYSTS Natural log of the number of analysts covering the 
firm. 
I/B/E/S 
INSTOWN_PERC Percentage of institutional ownership, computed as 
the number of shares owned by institutional investors 
divided by total number of shares outstanding. 
 
TFN 13-F 
Variable definitions for Hypothesis 1: 
TREAT An indicator variable equal to one for large 
accelerated filers required to disclose CAM during 




POST An indicator variable equal to one for fiscal years that 
end on or after June 30, 2019, and zero otherwise. 
Calcbench 
ABRET Abnormal stock return, computed as the three-day 
stock return around the 10-K filing date, minus the 
CRSP market return over the same period. 
 
CRSP 
HIGH_SHORT An indicator variable equal to one if the short interest 
for a firm-year is higher than the sample median of 
that particular fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Short 
interest is computed as total shares held short 




VOLATILITY Stock return volatility, computed as the standard 
deviation of daily abnormal stock returns for the 250 
trading-day period ending two trading days before the 






TURNOVER Average daily share turnover for the 250 trading-day 




DAYSAFTEREA Number of days between the earnings announcement 
and the 10-K filing. 
Compustat, 
Calcbench 
Variable definitions for Hypothesis 2: 
TREAT An indicator variable equal to one for large 
accelerated filers required to disclose CAM for fiscal 





POST An indicator variable equal to one for earnings 
announcements on or after the respective firm’s FY 
2019 10-K filing date, and zero otherwise. 
 
Calcbench 
CAR Abnormal stock return, computed as the three-day 
stock return around the 10-K filing date, minus the 
CRSP market return over the same period. 
 
CRSP 
UE Unexpected earnings, computed as I/B/E/S quarterly 
EPS minus the most recent median forecast of 
quarterly EPS prior to the earnings announcement, 




SIZE Natural log of market capitalization. Market 
capitalization is measured at the end of the fiscal year 
and is computed as share price (PRCC_F) times the 
number of shares outstanding (CSHO). 
 
Compustat 
MTB Market-to-book ratio, computed as share price 
(PRCC_F) times the number of common shares 
outstanding (CSHO) divided by the book value of 
common equity (CEQ). 
 
Compustat 
LEV Leverage, computed as long-term debt (DLTT) 
divided by total common equity (CEQ). 
Compustat 
BETA The regression coefficient from regressing a firm’s 
excess daily returns on excess market returns over the 







LOSS An indicator variable equal to one if basic earnings 
per share excluding extraordinary items (EPSFX) is 
less than zero, and zero otherwise. 
 
Compustat 
DISP The difference between the highest and lowest 
analyst forecasts, scaled by stock price two days prior 
to the earnings announcement. 
 
I/B/E/S, CRSP 
PERS Earnings persistence, computed as the regression 
coefficient from regressing quarterly EPS on past 
quarter EPS using up to 10 years of data. 
Compustat 
 
Variable definitions for Additional Tests: 
ΔSHORT Change in short interest from the latest report date 
before to the first report date after the 10-K filing 
date. Short interest is computed as total shares held 




B/P Book-to-price ratio computed as the ratio of book 
value of common equity (B) to the market value of 
common equity (P). B is Compustat’s common 
equity (CEQ) plus any preferred treasury stock 
(TKTKP) less any preferred dividends in arrears 
(DVPA), and is measured at the end of the fiscal 
year. P is the number of common shares outstanding 
(CSHO) multiplied by the stock price at the end of 
the fiscal period (PRCC_F). 
 
Compustat 
LOW_B/P An indicator variable equal to one if the B/P ratio for 
a firm-year is lower than the sample median of that 
particular fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
 
Compustat 
 
